Killing in  the name of islam: Al-Qaeda's justification for september 11 by Wiktorowicz, Quintan & Kaltner, John
76
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. X, NO. 2, SUMMER 2003
KILLING IN THE NAME OF ISLAM: AL-QAEDA’S
JUSTIFICATION FOR SEPTEMBER 11
Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner
Dr. Wiktorowicz is an assistant professor of international studies and Dr.
Kaltner is an associate professor of religious studies, both at Rhodes
College in Memphis, Tennessee.  The al-Qaeda document that serves as the
basis for this article is available in Arabic and English at www.mepc.org.
By means of this document we send a message to America and those behind it. We are
coming, by the will of God almighty, no matter what America does. It will never be safe
from the fury of Muslims. America is the one who began the war, and it will lose the battle
by the permission of God almighty.
– Al-Qaeda statement, April 24, 2002
I
n the wake of the September 11
attacks, President Bush moved
quickly to dismiss al-Qaeda opera-
tives as part of the lunatic fringe,
religious usurpers bent on misrepresenting
and “hijacking” Islam to serve terrorism.1
This characterization was echoed in the
Muslim world, where an assortment of
government officials, religious scholars and
opposition figures fervidly denounced the
killing of civilians as un-Islamic.2
Abdulaziz bin Abdullah al-Ashaykh, the
mufti of Saudi Arabia, argued that “hijack-
ing planes, terrorizing innocent people and
shedding blood constitute a form of injus-
tice that cannot be tolerated by Islam,
which views them as gross crimes and
sinful acts.”3  Muhammed Sayyid al-
Tantawi, the rector of al-Azhar University
in Cairo, issued a similar condemnation:
“Attacking innocent people is not coura-
geous, it is stupid and will be punished on
the day of judgment. . . . It’s not coura-
geous to attack innocent children, women
and civilians. It is courageous to protect
freedom, it is courageous to defend oneself
and not to attack.”4  Shaikh Yussuf al-
Qaradawi, a prominent Islamic scholar and
television personality from Qatar, empha-
sized that “Islam, the religion of tolerance,
holds the human soul in high esteem, and
considers the attack against innocent
human beings a grave sin.”5
Even Islamic fundamentalist groups
issued sharp denunciations.  Forty-six
leaders representing an assortment of
Islamist movements and groups signed a
letter opposed to the attacks:
The undersigned, leaders of Islamic
movements, are horrified by the
events of Tuesday 11 September 2001
in the United States, which resulted in
massive killing, destruction and attack77
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on innocent lives. We express our
deepest sympathies and sorrow. We
condemn, in the strongest terms, the
incidents, which are against all human
and Islamic norms. This is grounded in
the Noble Laws of Islam, which forbid
all forms of attacks on innocents. God
Almighty says in the Holy Quran: “No
bearer of burdens can bear the burden
of another” (Surah al-Isra 17:15).6
Signatories included the general guide of
the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the amir
of the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan and
Ahmad Yassin, the founder of Hamas.
To be sure, many of these condemna-
tions were blunted by concomitant criticism
of American foreign policy as the primary
catalyst for al-Qaeda’s war.  Leaders
throughout the Middle East, including
traditional allies, cautioned the United
States to reflect on the consequences of its
“unbalanced” approach to the region
(particularly vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and Iraq), and public opinion in the
Arab world indicated mounting resentment
against perceived American hegemony and
arrogance.  Yet in the wake of September
11, U.S. allies and adversaries alike in the
Muslim world joined President Bush in
rejecting the radicalism of al-Qaeda.
Given this broad rejection, how could
al-Qaeda defend killing thousands of
innocent civilians in the name of Islam?
Although pre-September 11 fatwas,
interviews and statements by Bin Laden
and al-Qaeda representatives clearly
outlined the movement’s belief that Ameri-
can civilians are legitimate targets, al-
Qaeda had yet to articulate its religious
rationale for attacks against civilian popula-
tions.  In the first six months after Septem-
ber 11, al-Qaeda failed to issue a response
to the maelstrom of criticism that de-
nounced the attacks as un-Islamic.  Then
finally on April 24, 2002, al-Qaeda released
an extended statement (approximately
3,700 words) outlining, for the first time, its
religious justification for killing civilians in a
total war against the United States, titled
“A Statement from Qaidat al-Jihad Re-
garding the Mandates of the Heroes and
the Legality of the Operations in New York
and Washington.”7 Unlike previous al-
Qaeda statements, the justification was not
published by Arabic or Western newspa-
pers and has largely been ignored by
experts.  Yet it provides essential insights
into the movement’s religious rationale for
September 11 that could help American
policy makers in the war on terrorism.
The 2002 statement is best understood
as part of an ongoing debate about the use
of violence in Islam.  Al-Qaeda is a
component of a broader “fundamentalist”
community and as a result is actively
engaged in debates about religious author-
ity, the legitimacy of war and rules of
engagement in combat.  In the 1990s, most
disputes focused on whether it was permis-
sible to rebel against incumbent regimes in
the Muslim world.  Toward the late 1990s,
this focus shifted to address the United
States as an emerging enemy and the
legitimacy of particular tactics in warfare
against unbelievers.  The 2002 document is
part of this latest debate and should
therefore be understood as an argument
that seeks not only to outline al-Qaeda’s
justification, but also address alternative,
competing religious interpretations about
acceptable violence in Islam.
DEBATING VIOLENCE
Al-Qaeda is a radical tendency within
a broader Islamic movement known as the
Salafi movement.  The term Salafi is78
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derived from the Arabic salaf, which
means “to precede” and refers to the
companions of the Prophet Muhammed.
Because the salaf learned about Islam
directly from the messenger of God, their
example is an important illustration of piety
and unadulterated religious practice.
Salafis argue that centuries of syncretic
cultural and popular religious rituals and
interpretations distorted the purity of the
message of God and that only by returning
to the example of the prophet and his
companions can Muslims achieve salva-
tion.  The label “Salafi” is thus used to
connote “proper” religious adherence and
moral legitimacy, implying that alternative
understandings are corrupt deviations from
the straight path of Islam.8
While Salafis all agree about the
importance of the prophetic model and the
paradigm of the companions, there are
important interpretive differences that have
engendered schisms within the movement,
particularly over the proper method to
create an Islamic society and protect the
umma (Muslim community).  Differences
in interpretation tend to emphasize one of
the following four basic methods for
promoting Islam:
1) Propagation (dawa).  Salafis who
focus on this method emphasize personal
piety, cleansing the corpus of hadiths
(reported sayings and traditions of the
Prophet Muhammed), and spreading
proper Islam.  For this group, the priority is
for individuals to practice a pure under-
standing of Islam.  This entails not only
propagation and individual piety, but a
program to eliminate any weak or false
hadiths so that Muslims ensure they are
truly following the prophetic model.
2) Advice.  A large number of
influential Salafis and their followers
believe that it is the responsibility of the
ulama (religious scholars) to advise leaders
about Islamic legislation and regulations.
In general, however, they believe this
advice should be given in private.
3) Non-violent action.  Some Salafis
believe that it is the duty of Muslims
(particularly the ulama) to openly speak out
against un-Islamic actions, decisions and
public policy.  This can include the use of
the khutba (Friday sermon), open letters,
public speeches, demonstrations and rallies.
4) Violent action.  A small, radical
fringe in the Salafi community argues that
it is an Islamic duty to use violence to
remove leaders who do not properly follow
or enforce Islam.  Known as jihadis, these
Salafis do not reject the other methods, but
they do emphasize the necessity of vio-
lence.  Al-Qaeda is part of this group.
These differences have produced
debates about the proper methodology for
promoting Islam, leading to often vitriolic
conflicts.  Because Salafis believe that
there is only one accurate understanding of
Islam – the model of the prophet and his
companions – this creates a tendency to
dismiss any differences of interpretation as
deviations.  It is quite common, for ex-
ample, for one Salafi group to call scholars
and followers from other clusters to “return
to the straight path.”  This has even
generated disagreements over who can be
considered a Salafi.  In particular, non-
violent Salafis, who make up the vast
majority of the movement, often vehe-
mently reject use of the Salafi label to
describe the violent or jihadi elements.9
The latter, however, identify themselves as
Salafis and dismiss the other groups as
misguided, ignorant (unknowledgeable79
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about Islam) or corrupt.
The debate within the Salafi commu-
nity over the use of violence has divided
the movement more than any other issue.
During the 1990s, as al-Qaeda developed,
the initial debate between violent and non-
violent Salafis was over takfir – declaring
a Muslim an apostate.  Declaring a Muslim
an unbeliever is a serious endeavor, since it
could mean a
death sen-
tence.  The
central axis of
divergence
was over
whether one
could judge a
ruler in the
Muslim world
an apostate according to his actions.  Non-
violent groups argued that one can never
know with certainty what is in an individ-
ual’s heart and that so long as a ruler has a
“mustard seed of iman (belief),” he is
considered a Muslim, especially if he
allows Muslims to pray and generally
practice their religion.  The jihadi Salafis,
on the other hand, argued that the oneness
of God (tawhid) demands that Muslims
follow Islam in both belief and action.  In
other words, an un-Islamic belief is just as
revealing as an un-Islamic action.  As a
result, the jihadis charged the Saudis and
other regimes in the Muslim world with un-
Islamic behavior and thus apostasy, and
called for a jihad to remove them.
In the late 1990s, although this debate
continued, it became less relevant to
Islamist struggles on the ground as jihadis
faced defeat and marginalization through-
out the Middle East.  This was particularly
the case in the largest Islamist insurgencies
in Egypt and Algeria.10  In Egypt, leaders
from both the Islamic Group and Islamic
Jihad declared cease-fires, and the vio-
lence came to a dramatic end.  Elements
from within the Islamic Group went so far
as to issue a public apology for the violence
and published a four-volume justification
for the decision.  In a move that epitomized
the recasting of the jihadis, a number of
Islamists from both groups attempted to
establish
political parties
(the Sharia and
Islah parties),
though the
regime re-
jected the
requests for
permits.
Violent jihadi
dissidents found themselves marginalized;
many left for Pakistan and Afghanistan to
work directly with al-Qaeda.
In Algeria, a similar process occurred.
The regime’s decision to cancel elections in
1992, as Islamists were poised to control
parliament, sparked an insurgency that has
claimed more than 150,000 lives.  Early in
the conflict, the jihadi Salafis united under
the banner of the Armed Islamic Group
(GIA) and attacked government officials
and soldiers.  In 1996, however, the GIA
launched a series of civilian massacres that
undermined the unity of the Islamist
opposition; and groups such as the Islamic
Salvation Army issued a unilateral cease-
fire.  The regime responded by using an
amnesty program to reintegrate former
Islamist fighters into society.  Although a
number of radical groups continue to
operate, the violence has dropped substan-
tially since the late 1990s.  As a result,
many Algerian jihadi Salafis placed their
networks, resources and personnel at the
Defeats made it clear that the jihadi
vision to unseat incumbent Arab
regimes was at an end and the focus
shifted to al-Qaeda’s war against the
United States and its allies.80
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service of al-Qaeda.11
For non-violent Salafis, these defeats
made it clear that the jihadi vision to unseat
incumbent Arab regimes was at an end (at
least in the short term), and so the issue of
takfir became less prominent in debates
over violence.  Instead, the focus shifted to
al-Qaeda’s war against the United States
and its allies.  In general, most Salafis
agree that the United States is waging a
war of aggression against Muslims through
its actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq
and elsewhere.  Differences emerge,
however, over the proper response and
course of action.  Jihadis once again call
for violence, while the non-violent Salafis
promote other means, including public
announcements of opposition to a U.S.
presence in the Middle East, prayer, and
advice to Arab and Muslim leaders.
This is the context in which one should
understand al-Qaeda’s 2002 justification
for September 11 and the purposeful
targeting of civilians.  The document is part
of a discursive contest over the proper
methodology for fulfilling religious obliga-
tions. As a result, it reflects a carefully
constructed case to undermine the legiti-
macy of non-violent solutions.  In this
respect, it makes three important argu-
ments.  First, proponents of a non-violent
response to the United States are corrupt,
ignorant and/or hypocritical, and therefore
are not credible religious mediators.  This is
contrasted with the scientific, independent
and religiously authentic interpretation of
the jihadi Salafis.  Second, the United
States is waging a war against Islam.
Therefore, violence is a defensive jihad
that is incumbent upon all Muslims.  And
third, there is no unconditional prohibition
against killing civilians in Islam.  In fact,
civilians can be purposely targeted under
certain conditions, and these conditions are
met in the current climate.
PERSUASION AND CREDIBILITY
For Muslims, scholars of Islam play a
critical role as intermediaries between the
sacred texts and everyday religious rituals
and practices.  They are seen as the
inheritors of the prophetic message,
intellectually equipped to interpret the
immutable sources of Islam in light of the
changing conditions of the temporal world.
For Islamists, the scholars are central
nodes in networks of religious meaning,
responsible for providing guidance and
mentoring students so that they might
follow the straight path of Islam to Para-
dise in the hereafter.  They provide reli-
gious interpretations and offer lessons,
books and lectures for those seeking
enlightenment.  For Salafis, in particular,
scholars are essential, since they are
purveyors of knowledge capable of illumi-
nating an unadulterated understanding of
Islam based upon the example of the
prophet and his companions.
Not all scholars are equal, however.
There are differences in training, intellec-
tual capacity, communicative skills and
charisma, all of which affect the reputation
and influence of individual scholars.  Those
with strong reputations develop extensive
followings and can use fatwas and other
vehicles to exert substantial influence.  The
term “scholar” (alim) itself does not reflect
objective criteria of learning; it is subjec-
tively derived recognition dependent upon
the reputation of the individual.  Whether
an individual is recognized as a scholar in
good standing determines the likelihood that
his interpretation will be accepted.
The debate over the conditions for
permissible violence is therefore more than81
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merely a conflict over ideas; it is a struggle
over sacred authority – the right to inter-
pret Islam on behalf of the Muslim commu-
nity.12  As studies of persuasion and
framing have noted, the impact of an
argument is determined not only by its
resonance with the experiences and
worldview of the target audience, but by
the credibility of the articulator as well.13
Influence is contingent upon the trustwor-
thiness and integrity of the scholar. A lack
of credibility can undermine the effect of a
religious interpretation or argument by
leading an audience to question the inten-
tions of the source and thus whether the
message represents an honest assessment
of Islam and the will of God.
The jihadi scholars who nurture al-
Qaeda and provide religious cover for acts
of violence suffer from a “reputation
deficit.”  Many are self-taught, new
Islamist intellectuals with little formal
religious training.  Others have spent their
lives studying Islam, but a dearth of
resources, sponsors and fora for communi-
cation limits their capacity to develop a
reputation.  There are a few classically
trained jihadi scholars with global notoriety,
such as Omar Abdul Rahman (the Azharite
shaikh and former mufti of several radical
Egyptian groups, now in jail in New York),
but these are the exceptions.  This is in
contrast to the training of the non-violent
Salafi scholars, many who hold PhDs from
established Islamic universities in Saudi
Arabia and are considered part of the
ulama in the kingdom.  Non-violent Salafis
thus find ample opportunity to dismiss the
jihadis as unknowledgeable or ignorant, a
pejorative insult among Salafis, who pride
themselves as students of learning.
The case of Umar Abu Qatada, one of
the key religious scholars of the al-Qaeda
network, highlights this reputation deficit.
Abu Qatada began his religious training
with Mohammed Nasir al-Din al-Bani (d.
1999), a renowned Salafi reformist who
came to Jordan after fleeing Syria in the
late 1970s.  Abu Qatada was part of a
small group of teenage students that
included eventual luminaries of the non-
violent Salafi community, such as Salim al-
Hilali and Ali Hasan al-Halabi.  He left al-
Bani’s study circle over the issue of
violence and continued his studies else-
where, eventually fleeing security services
in Jordan and relocating to London.  Abu
Qatada developed an impressive reputation
among small jihadi circles and became an
important reference point for the radical
jihadis in Algeria (both the GIA and the
Salafi Group for Call and Combat, or
GSPC).  His centrality as a jihadi scholar is
exemplified by his participation on the
fatwa committee of al-Qaeda.14  After the
9/11 attacks, Abu Qattada, who became
known as al-Qaeda’s European paymaster,
went underground; but he was caught in
the UK and imprisoned in late 2002.
Despite this considerable history,
reformists quickly dismiss Abu Qatada as
unknowledgeable.  For example, when
asked about Abu Qatada in an interview,
Salim al-Hilali quickly denounced him as
ignorant and claimed, “He is not a
scholar.”15  Such assaults on the credibility
of the jihadi scholars are common among
the non-violent Salafis.
As a result, much of the 2002 docu-
ment can be seen as an attempt to estab-
lish the credentials of the jihadis while
demeaning the credibility of the non-violent
reformists.  Since formal pedigree favors
the reformists, jihadis stress the issue of
scholarly independence and integrity.  The
thrust of this line of argument is that the82
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reformist scholars are “the rulers’ shaikhs”
– mouthpieces for Arab regimes, which, in
turn, are puppets of the United States.
This connotes an inextricable connection
between reformist legal rulings about
violence and the desire of authorities to
protect American interests, thus implying
that non-violent Islamic interpretations are
corrupted by politics and therefore unreli-
able and deceitful.  This is clearly the
argument at the onset of the document:
We pass on this initial report, without
details or exposition, regarding the
evidence of the legality of this kind of
operation. Let it be a quick message to
those who dress their political
opinions in the garb of a legal ruling.
Let it also be a call to those who
oppose and condemn the operations
to obey Allah, repent and return to the
legal evidence. Cowardice in defend-
ing the warriors (mujahidin) is no
better than being silent. Allah is our
guide and the guide of all Muslims.
Elsewhere, the connection between
opposition to the violence of al-Qaeda and
the dubiousness of reformist legal rulings is
again emphasized:
These great events which changed the
face of history on such a grand scale
occurred in the umma, and it will be a
great regret to anyone who blames
those who brought about the opera-
tion of September. Those ignorant
ones do not speak with legal evidence
or reasonable logic. Rather, they speak
in their masters’ languages [i.e., Saudi
Arabia] and in the concepts of the
enemy of the umma [i.e., the USA].
The jihadis go even further and charge
the reformists with apostasy because of
their support for the American war on
terrorism, an extreme condemnation that, if
true, would eliminate the reformists’ right
to issue legal rulings.
Despite the clarity of the matter and
the obvious nature of the evidence,
however, it is regrettable that many of
the motives were destroyed in the
comforting of America, the expres-
sions of sorrow for her, and the legal
rulings to assist her and to donate
blood for her innocent (!!) victims.
Legally incriminating the one who
carried out the operations and
expelling him from Islam is also
regrettable, as is giving the Crusaders
the green light to exact revenge on
Muslims. This teaches all those who
issue opinions that America may
pursue the Afghans and Shaikh
Usama Bin Laden, may Allah protect
him. We warn them about apostasy
because of their assistance to the
Crusaders by word or by their legal
rulings to Arab governments that
cooperation against terrorism [by this
they mean cooperation against the
mujahidin] is lawful. This is defiant
apostasy!
The document argues that the corrup-
tion of these religious scholars is clearly
demonstrated by the hypocrisy of their
rulings: the reformists condone the use of
martyrdom (suicide) operations in Palestine
against Israelis (including civilians) yet
denounce similar operations against Ameri-
cans, such as the September 11 attacks.16
The jihadis categorize both the Israelis and
Americans as “people of war”: Israel
occupies and oppresses Muslims in Pales-
tine; the United States oppresses and
attacks Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq and
elsewhere.  More important, Israel is83
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portrayed as an extension of an American
policy to attack the Muslim world, thus
representing the conflict in Palestine as only
one of many strategic components designed
to support U.S. aggression.  As a result,
they argue, one can use the same tactics
and strategies against both.  Those who
think otherwise are influenced by a political
agenda that ignores the sources of Islam
and the evidence legitimating September 11:
[Y]ou will truly be surprised by those
who rule that the martyrdom opera-
tions in Palestine in which civilians fall
victim are among the highest forms of
jihad, and then rule that the martyrdom
operations in America are wrong
because of civilian deaths. This
inconsistency is very strange! How
can one permit the killing of the
branch and not permit the killing of the
supporting trunk? All who permit
martyrdom operations against the
Jews in Palestine must allow them in
America. If not, the inconsistency
leads to nothing but a type of game
playing with the legal ruling.
The hypocrisy and treachery of the
non-violent Salafi scholars is contrasted
with the independence and purity of the
jihadis’ intentions.  Whereas the reformists
are seen as inspired by political ambition
and the interests of the United States and
its Arab allies, the jihadis are characterized
as influenced only by a desire to implement
divine will:
[T]he only motive these young men
had was to defend the religion of
Allah, their dignity, and their honor.  It
was not done as a service to humanity
or as an attempt to side with Eastern
ideologies opposed to the West.
Rather, it was a service to Islam in
defense of its people, a pure act of
their will, done submissively, not
grudgingly.17
The 2002 document notes the purity of
the mission with pride. And, in an interest-
ing shift from earlier denials, al-Qaeda not
only accepts its responsibility for Septem-
ber 11, but claims “that hiding all trace of
the agents of the operation was not some-
thing we considered.  Rather, some of the
heroes were intent on leaving Islamic
fingerprints on the operation.”
The purity of the jihadis is contrasted
with the corruption of their detractors in an
effort to impugn the reputation, credibility
and persuasive effect of alternative
religious interpretations.  As part of the
debate over the use of violence in Islam,
the document reflects the Salafi emphasis
on the centrality of reputable scholars
capable of interpreting Islam and providing
guidance for others.  Character assassina-
tion and charges of deception and igno-
rance are devices intended to weaken
opposing arguments.
JUST WAR AND JIHAD
In Islam, there are two types of
external jihad: offensive and defensive.18
In Islamic jurisprudence, the offensive jihad
functions to promote the spread of Islam,
enlightenment and civility to the dar al-
harb (domain of war).  In most contempo-
rary interpretations, the offensive jihad can
only be waged under the leadership of the
caliph (successor to the prophet). It is
tempered by truces and various reciprocal
agreements between the Islamic state and
non-Muslim governments, such as guaran-
teed freedom of worship for Muslim
minorities.  Today, very few Islamists focus
on this form of jihad.84
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The defensive jihad (jihad al-dafaa),
however, is a widely accepted concept that
is analogous to international norms of self-
defense and Judeo-Christian just-war
theory.19  According to most Islamic
scholars, when an outside force invades
Muslim territory, it is incumbent upon all
Muslims to wage jihad to protect the faith
and the faithful.  Mutual protection is seen
as a religious obligation intended to ensure
the survival of the global Muslim commu-
nity.  At the root of defensive jihad is a
theological emphasis
on justness, as
embodied in chapter
6, verse 151 of the
Quran: “Do not slay
the soul sanctified by
God except for just
cause.” Defending
the faith-based
community against
external aggression
is considered a just
cause par excellence.
In the contemporary period, this widely
accepted notion of the defensive jihad was
first put to the test in Afghanistan in the
1980s.  After the Soviets invaded Afghani-
stan in 1979 to prop up a failing communist
government, Islamic scholars throughout
the Muslim world called for jihad.  Thou-
sands of Muslim fighters flocked to Af-
ghanistan to fulfill their religious duty,
supported by Islamic charities, wealthy
individuals and governments in Muslim
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
and Pakistan.  State leaders and radical
Islamists alike concurred that the jihad was
an Islamic duty that could include fighting,
financial support, humanitarian work or
verbal assistance, depending on an
individual’s capacities and resources.  This
broad agreement was extended to justify
support for jihad in other conflicts as well,
including Bosnia and Chechnya.
In a disturbing confluence of opinion
regarding jihad, the focus on the just nature
of defensive war united both mainstream
Islamic scholars and al-Qaeda in opposition
to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
In a tape aired by al-Jazeera television on
February 11, 2003, as the U.S.-led coalition
built its forces on the borders of Iraq, Bin
Laden continued his call for jihad against
the U.S. “crusad-
ers” and their
pending invasion.20
Only a month later,
before the invasion
took place, Islamic
scholars at al-Azhar
University (Cairo),
the oldest Islamic
university in the
world, echoed Bin
Laden’s sentiments
and emphasized the need for a defensive
jihad: “According to Islamic law, if the
enemy steps on Muslims’ land, jihad
becomes a duty on every male and female
Muslim.”21 Although the al-Azhar scholars
may have used the term “jihad” to mean
non-violent struggle, the justification shared
al-Qaeda’s theological understanding about
the defensive nature of any such jihad.
Consistent with this understanding, the
2002 document frames September 11 and
other al-Qaeda operations as defensive
measures to protect the Muslim community
from outside aggression.  The argument
repeats the framing in earlier al-Qaeda
documents and includes a litany of U.S.
aggressions and crimes against Islam:
support for Israel against the Palestinians;
support for Serbian genocide against
The focus on the just nature
of defensive war united both
mainstream Islamic scholars
and al-Qaeda in opposition
to the U.S. invasion of Iraq
in March 2003.85
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Bosnian Muslims; support for India against
the Kashmiris; the U.S. invasion of Af-
ghanistan; actions in East Timor; support
for the Philippine aggression against
Muslims in the south.  The document
frames these examples as indicative of a
nefarious “Zionist-Crusader” plot to
annihilate Muslims.  Under this assault, al-
Qaeda argues that violence is the only
solution: “The only way to liberation from
this humiliation is the sword, which is the
only language the enemy understands that
will deter it.”  September 11 is thus por-
trayed as a defensive response necessary
to thwart U.S. aggression against the
Muslim world.
The document also addresses a very
particular criticism of al-Qaeda’s war
against the United States.  A number of
Salafis and Islamists have argued that, since
Muslim governments made treaties and
agreements with the United States and its
Western allies, it is illegal in Islam to wage
jihad against them.  This is based, in part,
upon a story narrated by Abdullah bin Amr
in which the prophet said, “Whoever kills a
muahid [a treaty partner] shall not smell
the fragrance of Paradise though its
fragrance can be smelt at a distance of
forty years (of traveling).”22  However, in
many interpretations of Islamic law, treaties
are revisited every ten years, and so
revisions can be made depending upon
changing conditions, needs or strategies.   If
the non-Muslim partner violates the treaty
conditions first, the agreement is voided.
Responding to this line of argument, al-
Qaeda dismisses the premise that the
Muslims ever had viable treaties with the
United States.  To some extent, this is
based upon the jihadi belief that govern-
ments in Muslim countries are controlled
by apostate regimes and therefore cannot
legitimately make treaties on behalf of
Muslims.  Such contracts are therefore null
and void.
In addition to this outright rejection, al-
Qaeda evaluates the argument on its own
basis and poses a counterargument.
Suppose a treaty really did exist?  Is it still
valid?  The document argues that the
innumerable acts of U.S. aggression
constitute massive breaches of any hypo-
thetical agreement.  These violations
render the “treaty” meaningless:
Truly, America is not, nor has it ever
been, a land of treaty or alliance. If we
were to line up with the other side and
say that it is a land of peace, we would
say that it has turned into a land of
war. That occurred with its violation of
the treaty and its help to the Jews for
more than fifty years in occupying
Palestine, banishing its people and
killing them. It is a land of war that
violated its treaty when it attacked and
blockaded Iraq, attacked and block-
aded Sudan, attacked and blockaded
Afghanistan. It has oppressed
Muslims in every place for decades
and has openly supported their
enemies against them.
For al-Qaeda, there is no treaty, and
the U.S. “atrocities” against Muslims
provide the rationale for a just and defen-
sive jihad.  The argument is rooted in
widely accepted Islamic principles about
justice and the legitimacy of a defensive
struggle and therefore appeals to main-
stream understandings about warfare.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND
CIVILIAN TARGETING
Fighting and killing in the name of
Islam are conditional, and there are impor-
tant rules of engagement that dictate and86
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limit targets and tactics.  The Prophet
Muhammed expended great energies
elaborating what was and was not permis-
sible during wartime, demonstrating the
importance of restraint and caution on the
battlefield.  The prohibitions against killing
innocent civilians, in particular, are numer-
ous, and non-violent Salafis and others
quote a number of hadiths to support their
opposition to the September 11 attacks,
including,
Set out for jihad in the name of Allah
and for the sake of Allah. Do not lay
hands on the old verging on death, on
women, children and babes. Do not
steal anything from the booty and
collect together all that falls to your lot
in the battlefield and do good, for
Allah loves the virtuous and the pious.
Many scholars also quote Abu Bakr,
the first caliph or successor to the Prophet
Muhammed.  He gave the following
instructions to a Muslim army setting out to
battle against the Byzantine Empire in Syria:
Stop, O people, that I may give you
ten rules for your guidance in the
battlefield. Do not commit treachery or
deviate from the right path. You must
not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a
child, nor a woman, nor an aged man.
Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn
them with fire, especially those which
are fruitful. Slay not any of the
enemy’s flock, save for your food. You
are likely to pass by people who have
devoted their lives to monastic
services; leave them alone.
In his response to the September 11
attacks, the mufti of Saudi Arabia focused
on the need to be fair and just, quoting an
assortment of Quranic verses prohibiting
oppression, such as “O My servants,
indeed I have forbidden oppression upon
Myself and I have also made it forbidden
amongst yourselves, hence to not oppress
each other,” and “O you who believe.  Be
of those who stand up to Allah, as wit-
nesses of justice.  And let not the hatred of
a people make you swerve away from
justice toward them.  Verily, be just, and
that is closer to piety.”23  Qaradawi builds
on such verses as well, highlighting Quran
5, 32: “Whosoever kills a human being for
other than manslaughter or corruption in
the earth, it shall be as if he has killed all
mankind, and whosoever saves the life of
one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of
all mankind.”24
Al-Qaeda, however, disputes the broad
prohibition against killing civilians on two
grounds.  First, it takes issue with the
notion that those killed in the September 11
attacks were “innocents” covered by the
prophet’s prohibitions. Second, al-Qaeda
argues that the prohibition is not an abso-
lute one and that there are conditions under
which killing civilians becomes permissible.
The movement thus takes on both the
theological argument proffered against the
September 11 attacks and reformist
framings of the victims as innocent.  The
result is a broad set of conditions that
provide religious justification for killing
civilians in almost every possible circum-
stance.  Only one condition need be met to
legitimize an attack against civilians.
Condition One: The Norm of
Reciprocity
The sources of Islam provide clear
prohibitions against killing civilians, but al-
Qaeda argues for reciprocal attacks.  This
is justified with reference to Quran 2, 194:
“And one who attacks you, attack him in87
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like manner as he attacked you.”  Thus, if
the enemy uses tactics that are prohibited
in Islam, these tactics become legal for the
Muslims.  Since the document makes the
case that America has purposely targeted
Muslim civilians, it presses readers to
accept the logical conclusion that civilian
targeting, as in September 11, is now legal.
This point is emphasized with particular
reference to the Palestinian struggle:
There currently exists an extermination
effort against the Islamic peoples that
has America’s blessing, not just by
virtue of its effective cooperation, but
by America’s activity. The best
witness to this is what is happening
with the full knowledge of the world in
the Palestinian cities of Jenin, Nablus,
Ramallah and elsewhere. Every day, all
can follow the atrocious slaughter
going on there with American support
that is aimed at children, women and
the elderly. Are Muslims not permitted
to respond in the same way and kill
those among the Americans who are
like the Muslims they are killing?
Certainly! By Allah, it is truly a right
for Muslims.
For al-Qaeda, the evidence points to a
clear conclusion:
It is allowed for Muslims to kill
protected ones among unbelievers as
an act of reciprocity. If the unbelievers
have targeted Muslim women, children
and elderly, it is permissible for
Muslims to respond in kind and kill
those similar to those whom the
unbelievers killed.
Condition Two: Inability to Distinguish
Civilians from Combatants
When attacking an enemy “stronghold”
it may be difficult to distinguish combatants
from non-combatants, particularly if enemy
fighters hide among the general population.
The Arabic term the document uses for
“stronghold” (hisn) has an interesting
semantic range in light of the targets of
September 11.  It refers to a place that is
immune to attack either because it is well
fortified or because great height makes it
impregnable.25  The connection with the
targets is obvious – what American sites
have been more clearly associated with
fortification and height than the Pentagon
and the World Trade Center?  Al-Qaeda
argues that so long as the stronghold is a
legitimate target and enemy fighters are
present, Muslims can attack, even if this
means civilian casualties: “It is allowed for
Muslims to kill protected ones among the
unbelievers in the event of an attack
against them in which it is not possible to
differentiate the protected ones from the
combatants or from the strongholds.”  So
even if one grants the argument that there
were innocent civilians in the buildings,
which al-Qaeda does not accept, the
buildings can still be attacked.
The document cites as evidence a
story in which Muslims asked about the
offspring and women of unbelievers who
stayed behind with the enemy fighters and
were killed.  The prophet was said to reply,
“They are from among them.”  In this
story, the women and children of the
enemy preferred to remain with their men
rather than flee to safety.  Once they made
that decision, they ceased to be innocents
because they had aligned themselves with
the combatants and were now legitimate
targets for the Muslim forces. The al-
Qaeda document suggests that those in the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon
should be viewed in the same way. The
distinction between combatants and88
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civilians is thereby erased since some of
the latter chose to remain in “enemy
territory.”
Condition Three: Assistance of
Civilians in “Deed, Word or Mind”
In Islamic law, the legitimacy of a
target in the context of a war is typically
determined by the capacity of that target or
individual to fight against the Muslims.
This includes enemy soldiers and leaders,
as well as advisers to the military and the
enemy leadership, including civilian advis-
ers.  The vast majority of civilians, how-
ever, are excluded from target lists be-
cause they are not actively engaged in
battle, especially
women, children
and the elderly,
whose capacity to
fight is considered
minimal in most
cases.26
Al-Qaeda,
however, broadens
the definition of
active participation to include roles that
indirectly assist the enemy:
It is allowed for Muslims to kill
protected ones among unbelievers on
the condition that the protected ones
have assisted in combat, whether in
deed, word, mind or any other form of
assistance, according to the prophetic
command.
This is based upon a story about Duraid
Ibn al-Simma, a well-known Arab poet
who strongly opposed Muhammad and the
message of Islam. According to tradition,
he was brought to the battlefield to advise
the Hawazin troops about battle proce-
dures in a conflict against the Muslims. As
a very old man, he posed no physical threat
to the Muslim forces, but the intelligence
he provided to the enemy made him a
target and led to his death in battle.
But al-Qaeda’s use of this story
creates an expanded understanding of
combat assistance that includes not only
direct support through physical participation
or advice to war planners, but less direct
support as well.  From this perspective, the
press and journalists are legitimate targets
because they are American propaganda
tools in the war against al-Qaeda.  Aca-
demics and intellectuals working on Islam
and/or terrorism can be killed because their
studies and publications help inform
government
officials and
provide knowl-
edge that can be
used against the
Muslims.  Em-
ployees working
in businesses that
supply the govern-
ment and/or
military can be targeted because they
provide equipment and services that
support the war or the leaders waging the
campaign.
The breadth of this category is under-
scored by al-Qaeda’s understanding of
American democracy.  It reasons that since
a democratically elected government reflects
the will of the people, a war against Islam of
this magnitude must have popular support.
Using the term “public opinion” (al-ray al-
amm) to represent the will of the people in a
democracy, al-Qaeda argues that,
It is stupidity for a Muslim to think
that the Crusader-Zionist public
opinion which backs its government
was waiting for some action from
Since a democratically elected
government reflects the will of
the people, a war against Islam
of this magnitude must have
popular support.89
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Muslims in order to support the
Crusader war against Islam and
thereby enkindle a spirit of hostility
against Islam and Muslims. The
Crusader-Zionist public opinion has
expended all it has in order to stand
behind the nations of the cross,
executing their war against Islam and
Muslims from the beginning of the
colonization of Islamic countries until
the present day. If the successive
Crusader-Zionist governments had
not received support from their
people, their war against Islam and
Muslims would not have taken such
an obvious and conspicuous form. It
is something that would not attain
legitimacy except by the voices of the
people.
This reflects the logic of an earlier
fatwa issued by Hammoud al-Uqla al-
Shuaybi just after September 11, which
was adopted by the jihadi Salafis.  In the
fatwa, al-Shuaybi argues,
[W]e should know that whatever
decision the non-Muslim state,
America, takes – especially critical
decisions which involve war – it is
taken based on opinion polls and/or
voting within the House of Represen-
tatives and Senate, which represent
directly, the exact opinion of the
people they represent – the people of
America – through their representa-
tives in the Parliament [Congress].
Based on this, any American who
voted for war is like a fighter, or at
least a supporter.27
Given this perspective, al-Qaeda scoffs
at the notion that those killed in the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, including those in the
World Trade Centers were “innocent
civilians.”  These individuals could be
targeted because they assisted the govern-
ment in its war against Muslims by “deed,
word or mind.”  The economic significance
of the towers as sources of revenue for the
government (through taxes or business, for
example) further damned its occupants.
This condition is so expansive as to include
virtually any individual in the United States
(or allied countries).
Condition Four: The Necessity of War
The document argues that it is permis-
sible to “kill protected ones among the
unbelievers in the event of a need to burn
the strongholds or fields of the enemy so as
to weaken its strength in order to conquer
the stronghold or topple the state.”
Throughout, al-Qaeda defines the World
Trade Centers as enemy “strongholds,” in
effect directly linking the centers to the
government and thus to the “war” against
Muslims.  In such an interpretation, the use
of flying suicide bombs is equivalent to
“burning” the stronghold.
Condition Five: Heavy Weaponry
Al-Qaeda uses a story about the
prophet in which he was asked whether
the Muslim fighters could use the catapult
against the village of Taif, even though the
enemy fighters were mixed with a civilian
population.  The Arabic term for catapult
(manjaniq) refers to any stone throwing
siege engine. In the early Islamic period
and later, such devices proved quite
effective against targets that were well
fortified and difficult to overcome, but they
were inaccurate and imprecise.  Taif,
located southeast of Mecca, was taken by
Muslim forces in 630 CE. They resorted to
the use of catapults in their assault because
the city was surrounded by a high brick
wall.  Al-Qaeda likens the catapult as a90
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heavy weapon to the planes used in the
September 11 attacks.  This is also the
religious evidence used by jihadis to
rationalize the acquisition and possible use
of weapons of mass destruction.
Condition Six: Human Shields
Al-Qaeda argues that it is permissible
to kill women, children and other protected
groups if the enemy uses them as human
shields (turs).  Although the religious
evidence for this is not outlined in the
document, it seems to derive from a fatwa
by the medieval Islamic jurist Ibn Taymiyya
that is widely cited by jihadis:
The Islamic scholars have unani-
mously agreed that when the Kafir
[unbeliever] takes Muslims as human
shields, and the Muslims fear defeat if
they do not attack, then it becomes
permissible to fire, but we aim at the
Kafir. Some scholars have said that it
is permissible to fire even if ceasing
fire will not form any kind of danger to
Muslims.28
This understanding is thus rooted in the
consensus of the scholars rather than
explicit textual evidence.
Condition Seven: Violation of a Treaty
The final condition is when the enemy
violates its treaty with the Muslims.  “It is
allowed for Muslims to kill protected ones
among unbelievers if the people of a treaty
violate their treaty and the leader must kill
them in order to teach them a lesson.  This
is just as the Prophet did among the Bani
Qurayza.” According to Islamic tradition,
Muhammad made a treaty with the
Qurayza tribe soon after the hijra, or
migration to Medina in 622 CE. It is re-
ported that he was later persuaded to
break that alliance and tear up the treaty.
The Qurayza did not engage in hostile
activity against Muslims but probably
negotiated with the enemy while Medina
was under attack. Upon learning of their
betrayal, Muhammad besieged them for 25
days. When they unconditionally surren-
dered, their men were killed and their
women and children were sold into slavery.
The sheer breadth of these conditions
leaves ample theological justification for
killing civilians in almost any imaginable
situation.  The notion that civilians become
legitimate targets because of “deed, word,
mind or any other form of assistance”
(condition three) is so broad that it encom-
passes virtually every American.  This is
particularly the case since the document
emphasizes the connection between
supportive public opinion in a democracy
and the ability of the government to wage
an extended war against Muslims.  And
since only one condition need be met to
provide a religious rationale for attack, al-
Qaeda justifies terrorism under an almost
inexhaustible array of possible scenarios
and conditions.
CONCLUSION: ECHOES OF
ALGERIA
These justifications echo the rationale
used by jihadi Salafis during the civil war in
Algeria, which could foreshadow the future
direction of al-Qaeda operations.  During
the conflict between the government and
Islamist rebels, jihadi groups massacred
civilians, assassinated public personalities
(including Berber singers, feminist leaders
and academics), and targeted members of
the press.  Between 1996 and 1998,
civilians were killed en masse in a directed
and purposeful strategy of total war that91
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eventually claimed more than 150,000 lives
(mostly civilians).  The rationale used to
justify these killings represents a chilling
precursor to the 2002 al-Qaeda document.
As in the al-Qaeda justification, the
jihadis in Algeria broadened the under-
standing of combat to include any individual
or group seen as complicit in the regime’s
counterinsurgency efforts against the
Islamists.  In an interview with al-Djamaa,
which claimed to represent the “official
voice of the GIA in the West,” GIA chief
Abu al-Moudhir argued that civilians who
fought against the jihad by “force, talk or
with the pen” were legitimate targets,29
reflecting a doctrine of total war.  As a
GIA communiqué put it, “There is no
neutrality in the war we are waging.  With
the exception of those who are with us, all
others are apostates and deserve to die.”30
This Manichaean worldview con-
demned broad swathes of the civilian
population to death.  Reporters and the
press were attacked as extensions of the
regime used to “cover its crimes and
rationalize its aggression.”31 The jihadis
supported killing those “who do not pray,
who drink alcohol and take drugs, homo-
sexuals, and immodest or debauched
women.”32  Seven Trappist monks were
beheaded for “mixing with [the Algerian
people], living with them, and blocking the
way of Allah by calling people to Christian-
ity, and these are the worst ways of
fighting the religion of Allah and Mus-
lims.”33  Even children attending govern-
ment-controlled schools were not immune
to violence.34  The scope of the violence
was startling, and no quarter of society
was immune from attack.
Given the stark parallels between the
justifications for killing civilians in Algeria
and the 2002 al-Qaeda document, the
Algerian conflict may portend the future
direction of al-Qaeda operations.  Algerian
jihadis attacked civilians with machetes,
burned people alive, and slit throats in a
brutal violence rationalized through broad
categorization of legitimate civilian targets.
The murder of reporter Daniel Pearl,
whose throat was slit by al-Qaeda opera-
tives in Pakistan, mirrors the brutality of
the Algerian campaign.  Al-Qaeda has thus
far relied mostly on bombs and planes, but
it is clear from the 2002 document that the
echoes of Algeria could become louder as
the jihadis continue to expand their war
against U.S. civilians.
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